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NEGOTIATED PROCUREMENT AND THE RULE
OF LAW: THE FIASCO OF PUBLIC
LAW 87-653*
C. S. McCLELLAND**
I. INTRODUCTION
A SENATOR from a large eastern seaboard state recently remarked
on the floor of the Senate that he did not hold that there have been
any irregularities in the awarding of defense contracts. He attributed the
failure of his state to get more of them to the continued use of negotiated
in lieu of formally advertised procurement, notwithstanding Public Law
87-653. He stated that when the Department of Defense (hereinafter
referred to as DOD) seeks bids (proposals) for developmental, experi-
mental and research contracts, it "asks several firms to submit bids and
these firms tend to be confined to the west coast-often in the State of
California."' The Senator's remarks are important for several reasons.
They are an example of many similar expressions of concern arising from
continuous reports of persistent unemployment and its accompanying
hardships in various districts, as well as from business constituents who
want a fair chance to compete for the award of Government contracts.
The remarks do not include a demand for justification in relation to
applicable law nor a showing of facts to demonstrate the existence of
good (or bad) faith in the determination to use negotiation. They thus
show an insufficient basis for knowledge of whether any irregularities
actually are involved. They overlook the obligation of the member's own
branch of the Government to keep informed, to state the law and to de-
clare the illegalities, as later explained in this article. The remarks dis-
close an unawareness that on the basis of the facts presented, there is no
law authorizing less competition in negotiated procurement than in for-
mally advertised procurement.' This means, of course, that such a limita-
tion on the solicitation of bids, as described by the Senator, is without
authority of law and therefore involves a serious irregularity.
The seriousness of the irregularity is not limited to the lack of
* Public Law 87-653 was the enactment of H.R. 5532, in 76 Stat. 528 (1962), amending
§§ 2304 (modifying § 2304(a) and adding § 2304(g)), 2306 (modifying § 2306(a) by sub-
stituting "subsections (b)-(f)" for "subsections (b)-(e)," and adding § 2306(f)), 2310(b),
2311 of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, as amended, 10 US.C. §§ 2301-14
(1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304-11 (Supp. IV, 1963).
** Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. 109 Cong. Rec. 16232 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1963) (remarks of Senator Javits).
2. CL 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (Supp. IV, 1963); 10 U.S.C. § 2305(a) (1958).
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authority in law. Unwarranted limitations on. competition in public
procurement violate the most basic requirement in all public procurement
that all parties be given equal opportunity to compete for any awards.8
Establishment of such an irregularity enables members of Congress to
insist that competitively limited and noncompetitive contracts be declared
invalid and that a close surveillance be maintained over procurement
officials to see that they understand the illegality sufficiently not to
repeat it. To indicate on the floor of Congress that no impropriety is
involved is to encourage more of the precise procurement which its mem-
bers deplore, to prolong the misunderstanding, and to give constituents
the erroneous impression that something other than actions without
authority of law is involved.
Congress and the public taxpayer have no established check on the
observance of the law and exercise of good judgment in DOD's use
of $24 billion4 in public funds annually in the award and administration
of defense contracts unless, and except to the extent that, the General
Accounting Office (hereinafter referred to as GAO)," a part of the legisla-
tive branch of the Government and the "watchdog of the Treasury," dis-
charges the obligations imposed upon it by the Armed Services Procure-
ment Act of 19476 and other law.7 Thus the importance of evaluating
the soundness and validity of the concept of GAO and its discharge
of its obligations appears clear. The Committee on Government Opera-
tions has the responsibility to do so,' but it has furnished the public
no evaluation of GAO's position on its statutory obligations in negotiated
procurement.
The law obligates the GAO to make a continuous comprehensive review
and evaluation of the facts relied upon in all cases of negotiated pro-
curement with limited or no competition. These facts are essential to
determine in what types of cases awards are actually justified with some-
thing less than full and free competition, so that authority in law may be
provided to the extent necessary. However, GAO's avowed reasons for
not discharging its statutory obligation to review are most irrelevant.
3. 34 Decs. Comp. Gen. 551, 552 (1955).
4. H.R. Rep. No. 1797, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960).
5. "GAO" is used in the article to refer to both the General Accounting Office and Its
head, the Comptroller General.
6. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-57 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304-11 (Supp. IV, 1963).
7. 42 Stat. 23, 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. §§ 41, 53-54 (1958); 60 Stat. 837 (1946), 31 U.S.C.
§§ 59-60 (1958).
8. S. Rep. No. 52, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961); H.R. Rep. No. 184, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1961).
9. 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. §§ 53-54 (1958); 60 Stat. 837 (1946), 31 U.S.C. §§ 59-60
(1958) ; S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947).
[Vol. 32
NEGOTIATED PROCUREMENT
It believes that the findings of fact in procurement determinations are
stereotyped, and that it has no authority to overrule.10 It is dear, how-
ever, that one congressional purpose in providing for GAO review was
to preclude stereotyped determinations by the agencies. Indeed, any
trace of stereotyping would appear to be evidence of lack of good faith,
which GAO is obligated to find in order to uphold any negotiated pro-
curement action. Notwithstanding its disclosure that it does not perform
its statutory obligation of independent review after the procurement
becomes an actual fact, GAO has declared that effective control of
negotiated procurement practices must also include authority (obliga-
tion) to make such a review before the fact.1 But because the facts
have not been reviewed in any substantial number of cases, there is no
basis on which to make a significant evaluation of competitively limited
and noncompetitive procurement. True, GAO has indicated that the DOD
could use much more formal advertising in its procurements and could
obtain much more competition in its negotiated procurement, i.e., where
there is no formal advertising."2 But GAO's disclosure of nonperformance
of its review and evaluation obligation shows that it actually has not
assembled the facts and pointed out to DOD and Congress the cases
demonstrating DOD irregularity. On the other hand, DOD in effect
has chided GAO for never questioning its determinations and findings
filed with GAO as required by law in support of its negotiated procure-
ment, and for not, in a period of over thirteen years, producing more
than twenty-five reports on Air Force procurement covering five years
in which approximately five million procurement actions were initiated."
What few cases GAO has reviewed have not received the GAO evaluation
required by law. The GAO made no mention of good faith or the lack
of it, and took no position on the question of legality. Congress has
failed to recognize the seriousness of the deficiencies in the GAO reviews.
Rather, it has generally seemed more interested in upholding an irregular
procurement, in the interest of so-called expediency to protect the con-
tractor as well as the Government. In so doing Congress perpetuates
the injustice to many contractors who are deprived of opportunity to
compete, to many unemployed, and to the Government which must pay
10. S. Rep. No. 4, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 17-18 (1961) ; Hearings on Military Procurement
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 399 (1960).
11. S. Rep. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1962).
12. S. Rep. No. 4, supra note 10, at 12-13.
13. Id. at 17. See also Hearings on Procurement Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 271 (1960); Hearings on
Weapons System Management Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed
Services, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 673 (1959).
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much more than items would be worth in a competitive market. Congress
also, instead of demanding the surveillance and enforcement of existing
procurement law by those who have that obligation, merely enacts
more procurement law without regard to its efficacy.
On September 10, 1962, an amendment to the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act became law, based upon House bill H.R. 5532, which on
June 7, 1962, was represented on the floor of the House as one to restore
the rule of law 4 to the military procurement processes and to increase
competitive purchasing. 6 Actually, the one provision which would have
restored the rule of law to a certain type of procurement-for years made,
and still being made, without legal authority-was dropped from the
bill after it reached the Senate and therefore failed of passage as part
of the new amendment.' 6 At the time the bill was presented to the House,
one member noted that it had issued from Committee with a minority
report by three members, whereas it was his recollection that "all
previous bills from the great Committee on Armed Services have always
been reported unanimously by that committee."' He expressed doubt
"that this particular measure is a step in the right direction" '18 and ex-
pressed the view "that while [one section] . . . has a constructive sound
* . . [it] uses rubber terminology and will likely increase administrative
costs and delay procurements,"' and that the "ideas behind the bill
explain some of its provisions better than the provisions themselves."2
These statements on the bill, which is now law, appear valid from a
close examination of the language of the new law. It has nomenclature
which no one, including its sponsor, GAO, has defined.2' Its history fails
to show how some of its provisions would actually be applied, thus leaving
matters to personal discretion, which is the antithesis of rule by law.
To the six procurements previously provided, it adds four more, in which
the agency finding as to the justification is expressly made final, "2 if in
good faith and not fraudulent, whereas one objective of GAO and the
House Armed Services Committee (hereinafter referred to as HASC) in
14. The terms "rule of law" and "government by law" are used in the usual sense--the
evaluation and resolution of matters in the light of applicable law and case precedent.
15. 108 Cong. Rec. 9967 (1962) (remarks of Congressman Thornberry).
16. 108 Cong. Rec. i7920-21 (1962).
17. 108 Cong. Rec. 9967-68 (1962) (remarks of Congressman Smith).
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Hearings on H.R. 5532 Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 63, 92 (1962).
22. 10 U.S.C. § 2310(b) (Supp. IV, 1963), amending 70A Stat. 132 (1956).
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enacting the new law was to eliminate the finality provision entirely.
It will be shown that instead of requiring more procurement by formal
advertising in order to increase competition and reduce the use of nego-
tiated procurement, the language of the new law suggests opposite results.
It modifies the general policy statement of prior law which declared that
purchases "shall be made by formal advertising.124 Most serious of all its
defects, the new law provides certain express, general authority to nego-
tiate purchases without competition. No such broad authority existed pre-
viously. The new law also fails to come to grips with the real problems
which must be solved to "restore the rule of law to the military procure-
ment processes,' 2 5 especially with respect to requiring GAO to do its
job of fact finding, so as to furnish Congress a sound basis for determining
what steps should be taken. Its history is persuasive to show that there
still is no accord, and only more confusion, within and between agencies,
including GAO, and within Congress as to the various aspects and
requirements of procurement law.
The new law provides no authority for the go-called weapon system
method of procurement, which annually involves many billion dollars of
procurement. On.April 16, 1959, GAO expressed its disapproval2 of
the Saltonstall bill, 2 which sought to provide a legal basis for that
method. The Office proposed no alternative bill to provide such a basis.
Later, GAO referred to Sections 3 and 9 of the Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 195828 as explicit authority for that method. Yet
neither that act nor its legislative history contains any language to
provide such authority, or authority sufficient to enable DOD "to make
its procurements in the manner that it feels proper," as testified by
GAO. In substance both merely provide authority to the Secretary of
Defense to enter into contracts with the Government, or with outside
agencies and institutions, for research and development. Neither provides
any authority for the delegation of controls, award, administration and
numerous contracting office functions, and other responsibilities of the
executive branch, or to waive competition in procurement because it may
delay deliveries,2 as is found in the functioning of the weapon system
23. Hearings on HEI.R. 5532, supra note 21, at 75-91; 108 Cong. Rec. 9977-78 (1962) (re-
marks of Congressman Wbert).
24. 70A Stat. 128 (1956).
25. 108 Cong. Rec. 9967 (1962) (remarks of Congressman Thornberry).
26. Hearings on S. 500 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Ser-
vices, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1959).
27. S. 500, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
28. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 26, at 662; 72 Stat. 514, 516, 520-21 (1958).
29. Hearings on Government Procurement, supra note 10, at 401.
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method. 0 And there was no statutory authority for the use of that
method prior to 1958. Also, the fact alone that the method involves
procurement without competition renders the method illegal. Yet there
is no record that GAO ever reported its use to Congress as an illegal
practice during the years it was used before 1958. It is no wonder that
one congressman experienced difficulty in reconciling its practice with
the Armed Services Procurement Act.3 Its illegality is clear from certain
portions of that act which restrict delegation of procurement powers to
officials of Government agencies only. 2
II. GAO's "FEASIBLE-PRACTICABLE" TEST
Subsection (a) of Public Law 87-653 (H.R. 5532) requires procure-
ment by formal advertising "in all cases in which the use of such method
is feasible and practicable under the existing conditions and circum-
stances."3 It is based upon a GAO theory that it will cause more
purchases to be made by formal advertising than were made under prior
law.34 Prior law, however, unlike 87-653, contained no exceptions in
its statement that purchases "shall be made by formal advertising." 8
As a procurement law, it was a clearly stated implementation of the
policy desired by Congress that formal advertising shall be the rule.
By adding the "feasible and practicable" exception language to that
clause, the new law qualifies it and gives the erroneous impression that
the policy rule has been relaxed. How GAO expects an increase in formal
advertising is not clear. Thus, the logic of the GAO theory, on which the
new law'is based, appears insupportable.
To "assure compliance" with the feasible-practicable requirement,
GAO stated that a further amendment to existing law would be necessary,
requiring written documentation, and an "effective" review of facts,
clearly and convincingly establishing justification for purchasing, not
pursuant to the general rule, but pursuant to certain of the exceptions
to that rule, as provided in clauses (2) and (4) to (14) inclusive. "'
30. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 26, at 545-59; but see Hearings on Weapons System
Management, supra note 13, at 27-30.
31. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-83 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304-58 (Supp. IV, 1963);
Hearings on Weapons System Management, supra note 13, at 35.
32. 10 U.S.C. § 2311 (Supp. IV, 1963).
33. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV, 1963); see
10 U.S.C. §§ 2304(g), 2306(f), 2310(b), 2311 (Supp. IV, 1963).
34. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense Before a Special
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 683, 731
(1960); S. Rep. No. 1884, supra note 11, at 18.
35. 70A Stat. 128 (1956).
36. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 34, at
683, 730; S. Rep. No. 1884, supra note 11, at 26.
[Vol. 32
NEGOTIATED PROCUREMENT
However, the amendment does not provide for adequate written docu-
mentation or an effective review because of the clauses of exception
which GAO omitted from its coverage. GAO first omitted clauses (1),
(3), (15), (16) and (17)' 7 and later excluded (4), (5), (9), (11) in
part, (13) and (14)." Since GAO did not provide in at least 11 of "all
[17 possible] cases" what the sponsor itself declared necessary to "assure
compliance," the prospect of section (a)'s being an effective amendment
to foster more formal advertising appears further questionable.
Other serious deficiencies of the new law are that the qualifying
language, "feasible and practicable," is not defined in the law nor in its
legislative history, and there is no indication of the identity of the
official who is to determine feasibility and practicability. The meaning
intended is left uncertain. 9 It appears that both words mean "possible,"" °
and the legislative history is no help, for it fails to show that the two
words were used to provide two different meanings."' Thus, the new
law is redundant in its language.
Establishment of the meaning "possible" as that which must be
attributed to the words "feasible and practicable" does not remove the
uncertainty as to how the new law is to be observed. For example, in the
past GAO has stated that it was necessary first actually to use formal
advertising to determine whether that method could be successful to
procure an item which might be thought to be available from only one
source because of quality, quantity or type involved.- But as to the
feasible-practicable test in the new law, GAO said that the Defense
Department should establish the criteria.43 However, since the law was
proposed by GAO, it would seem that that office should be the one to
make it clear in the legislative history how it wants the defense agencies
37. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 34, at
730.
38. 'We therefore recommend favorable consideration of section (i)." S. Rep. No. 1884,
supra note 11, at 26.
39. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 34, at
746-47.
40. Black, Law Dictionary 1335 (4th ed. 1951), defines "practicable" as "that which may
be done, practiced, or accomplished, that which is performable, feasible, pos-ible .... "
See also 33 Words & Phrases ("Practicable") 172. Webster, New International Dictionary 926
(3d ed. 1961), defines "feasible" as "capable of being done, executed, or effected: possible
of realization .... .
41. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 34, at
412, 746.
42. 41 Decs. Comp. Gen. 484-90 (1962); 39 id. 566 (1960); 37 id. 524 (1958); 30 id. 34
(1950); 23 id. 395 (1943); 18 id. 579 (1939); 16 id. 318 (1936).
43. Hearings on Procurement, supra note 13, at 155-57.
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to determine, in each procurement whether it is possible to use formal
advertising.
In 1947, Congress used what were, in effect, five criteria in determining
the impossibility of procurement by formal advertising in the situations
involved in the seventeen exceptions to the formal advertising require-
ment in the 1947 act. The criteria were price, quality, quantity, time
(including time to draft specifications or to await delivery under a con-
tract awarded pursuant to formal advertising), and type (including
multiple source availability)."4 These criteria appear to be the basis for
the statement by the cognizant House committee in 1947 that the public
interest requires that purchases be made without advertising in the situa-
tions excepted. The Committee stated that it had thoroughly examined
the need for authorizing the seventeen exceptions.40 The provision for
those exceptions in the 1947 act was in effect a legislative predeterminas
tion that in the enumerated situations, it would not be possible for the
agencies to accomplish their procurement demands by formal ad-
vertising. Even as to exceptions (3) and (9), covering, respectively, small
purchases and purchases of perishables, it is clear from the legislative
history that the cost of formal advertising was considered so high as to
render it impossible by that method to secure the goods at the price
at which, in the public interest, they should be procured.4 Also, an
examination of exceptions (11) through (16) and their legislative history
will disclose that they involve situations in which (rightly or wrongly)
it was considered impossible to procure by formal advertising. 47
But by the language of subsection (a) of the bill proposed by GAO-
now enacted into law-GAO and Congress in effect have rejected the
1947 predeterminations of impossibility reflected in the seventeen
exceptions to the formal advertising rule. In effect they declare that
there is no situation under the various exceptions, or, in other words,
no exception, which of itself precludes the use of formal advertising.
Thus they declare in substance that predeterminations of impossibility
may not be made. Instead, a determination must be made "in all cases."
The effect is to negate the existing law's exceptions to formal advertising
and to relegate the exceptions to the status of a regulatory list of circum-
stances which might justify waiver of formal advertising, thus reverting
44. S. Rep. No. 571, supra note 9, at 2; H.R. Rep. No. 109, 80th Cong., 1st Sess, 6 (1947);
10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1)-(16) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (14), (g) (Supp. IV,
1963).
45. H.R. Rep. No. 109, supra note 44, at 3.
46. S. Rep. No. 1900, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1960). As for perishables, the cost of the
delay incident to advertising appears to have been persuasive.
47. Hearings on Procurement, supra note 43, pt. 1, at 59-63.
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to pre-Civil War status when the sole recognized exception was one
created by construction only-a public exigency which did not admit
of the delay incident to advertising. In addition to including within its
terms procurements during a national emergency, the new law enacted
pursuant to GAO recommendation, in order to insure a determination
with respect to every procurement as to whether it is possible to use
formal advertising, is stated so broadly that it even includes the procure-
ment of personal services and procurements during a public exigency
which does not admit of the delay incident to advertising. Yet authority
to make procurement by negotiation in these latter situations has been
recognized since at least 1860,48 irrespective of whether the facts in a
given case actually show that it is possible to accomplish procurement by
formal advertising. Notwithstanding the effect of the requirement, in the
new law, of a determination of impossibility "in all cases," the reports
and testimony of GAO, and certain congressional reports, show that
the scope of subsection (a) is stated much more broadly than it should
be. Perhaps that is because no one asked GAO to demonstrate how its
feasibility-practicability test would operate when actually applied to
each of the various situations involved in the seventeen clauses of ex-
ception. In any event, it is clear that if those who placed the final stamp
of approval on the draft of subsection (a) had associated the draft with
the applicable reports and testimony, they would have discovered that
of the seventeen situations in which the GAO feasible-practicable test
ostensibly operates under the language of subsection (a), there remained
not more than two of "all cases," as referred to in the subsection.
In its testimony as recorded in the legislative history, GAO actually
referred to "'any exception which does not of itself preclude the use of
formal advertising,""' and mentioned exceptions (3) and (12) as ex-
amples of those which do." Similar examples indicated by GAO are
(1), (2), (10), (13), (15) and (16).11 Most of the remainder of the
seventeen exception situations which GAO does not, and some which
it does, acknowledge as in themselves precluding the use of formal
advertising are declared by the Senate Armed Services Committee as
making formal advertising impossibley- confirming across-the-board
determinations of impossibility by the Department of Defense. Only two
exceptions (7) and (8), out of "all cases," appear to remain subject to
48. Id. at 52, 54.
49. Hearings on Procurement, supra note 43, pt. 2, at 155.
50. Ibid.
51. Hearings on Military Procurement, supra note 10, at 381.
52. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 34, at
677; S. Rep. No. 1900, supra note 46, at 29.
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the GAO-sponsored subsection (a). Thus, while the language of sub-
section (a) on its face negates the 1947 predeterminations of im-
possibility, the references in its legislative history to across-the-board
determinations and to self-exclusions in effect uphold those predetermi-
nations.
The conflict between the all-inclusive language of subsection (a) and
the exclusions acknowledged by GAO, DOD and the Senate Armed
Services Committee appears to a substantial extent to be due to one fact
alone. Because of its inaction with respect to its statutory review and
evaluation responsibility, GAO had comparatively few facts on which
to base the language used in subsection (a). Nevertheless, in all nego-
tiated procurement actions the burden remains with GAO to decide
whether the determinations to negotiate are supported by the facts
necessary to show that the determinations were made in good faith. And
if unable "to reconcile the determinations made to support the negotia-
tion"--for M-113 personnel carriers, for example, as GAO testified in
the sole source procurement hearings---it may be that the determina-
tions are so erroneous as to invalidate them. In those hearings GAO
advised that the M-113 contract must be recognized as a valid and
binding obligation of the United States. In support of that advice GAO
cited 10 U.S.C. § 2310 and certain portions of the pertinent legislative
history "which indicate that determinations to negotiate under 10 U.S.C.
2304(a)(16), and contracts awarded pursuant to such negotiations,
are final and not subject to invalidation or challenge by the Comptroller
General or the courts."54 But GAO failed to mention another part of that
legislative history containing a statement by GAO that "both the ac-
counting officers and the courts have recognized that determinations
and decisions fraudulently made, or so grossly erroneous as to imply bad
faith, have no finality." 5 GAO promised to report to Congress any abuses
of the finality authority. 6 Despite its commitment of many years to do
so, GAO did not report as to whether it considered the determination
to negotiate for the M-113 carriers to have been made in good faith. It
should have done so, and there should not have remained unchallenged
by the hearing subcommittee the GAO statement that it could not
question the validity of the contract. It has the authority and the respon-
sibility to do so even if there is no ground, such as fraud or bad faith, on
53. Hearings on Sole Source Procurement Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1268 (1960).
54. Ibid.
55. S. Rep. No. 571, supra note 9.
56. Ibid.
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which it may ignore the finality of the administrative action."1 In ad-
vancing the enactment of 87-653, GAO ignored these anomalous aspects
of its position. Yet, the actual langauge of subsection (a) of the bill
proposed by GAO, and now enacted into law, constitutes a declaration
by GAO that all of the 1947 determinations of impossibility were
unwarranted.
Some of the authorized exceptions to formal advertising are probably
unjustified and are no doubt abused. However, to pass legislation when
the record is so replete with evidence that for the most part such legisla-
tion not only would not be, but also actually is not intended to be,
observed or productive, is a mockery of the rule-by-law doctrine and a
cause of more unwarranted public expense arising out of the resultant
confusion and time consumed by those trying to observe the law. 8
What has been said of the deficiencies in GAO treatment of the M-113
case constitutes the whole issue raised by section (a) of Public Law
87-653. The section appears to intimate that the agencies have not been
using good faith in their determinations to use negotiated procurement,
in any of the seventeen circumstances waiving formal advertising. But
this intimation is not based upon evidence. GAO's disclosure that it does
not perform its statutory review responsibility shows that it has not as-
sembled the evidence. The section furnishes no more protection against
abuse of negotiated procurement than the law prior to 87-653. That
protection remains dependent upon GAO's performance of its review
responsibility, to ascertain whether the facts clearly show that the agency
determinations were made in good faith. Therefore, there was and is no
need for section (a). The only need is for GAO to perform its statutory
responsibility."9 Especially apropos is a statement made recently by a
member of Congress with respect to another legislative bill that "all we
are doing in this instance is taking great credit to ourselves for having
reworded some language, to the effect that we are going to control this
program . . .when in reality we are not.""0 It appears appropriate at
this point to note the existence of a GAO-approved procedure which
conflicts with GAO's professed objective of controlling the procurement
program. The procedure was approved by GAO at approximately the
same time that Office was advancing its legislative amendment.
57. 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. §§ 53-54 (1958); 60 Stat. 837 (1946), 31 U.S.C. §§ 59-
60 (1958).
58. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 34, at
677.
59. 42 Stat. 24, 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. §§ 41, 53-54 (1958) ; 60 Stat. 837 (1946), 31 U.S.C.
§§ 59-60 (1958); 10 U.S.C. § 2310(b) (Supp. IV, 1963).
60. 107 Cong. Rec. 17682 (1961) (remark of Senator Capehart).
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III. THE SO-CALLED Two-STEP FORMAL ADVERTISING PROCEDURE
In June 1960, the Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation
protested to GAO the award of a contract for cameras under a two-step
procurement, on the ground that the two-step formal advertising pro-
cedure is so unreasonably restrictive as to violate the concept of full and
free competition required in ordinary formal advertising."'
GAO first reviewed the background and meaning of the two-step
procurement method, which had been instituted at the suggestion of the
Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the House Armed Services
Committee. 2
The procedure employed in two-step advertising was likened to that
followed in the procurement of qualified products, 3 whereby award is
restricted to manufacturers who have previously qualified their products.
This procedure was approved on the ground that the principles enunciated
with approval in a GAO decision on qualified products procurement
are applicable to two-step procurement. The "principles" relied upon by
GAO were that "[administrative] agencies are vested with a reasonable
degree of discretion to determine the extent of competition which may
be required [in particular cases and] . . .legitimate restrictions on com-
petition in Government procurement have been determined to be valid
when the needs of the agency require it." 4 Students of Gertrude Stein",
may be able to explain the value of a "principle" that "legitimate"
restrictions are "valid" restrictions, but its value in the context of the
GAO decision purporting to establish the validity of two-step formal
advertising as a method of procurement is not apparent.
Under the government- (or rule-) by-law doctrine, the validity of
any procurement method must be determined-as was not done in the
GAO decision-on the basis of applicable law, which in this respect
provides that purchase of goods and services shall be by formal ad-
vertising unless the circumstances of the procurement qualify for pro-
curement by negotiation under one of the seventeen clauses of exception
to the formal advertising requirement; 6 that is to say, in the event a
government agency wishes to avoid the formal advertising method of
procurement required by law, it must be able to equate the circumstances
of the procurement with one of those clauses of exception, if the govern-
ment-by-law doctrine is to be observed. If the doctrine is ignored, an
61. 40 Decs. Comp. Gen. 40 (1960).
62. Id. at 41-42.
63. Id. at 42.
64. The Heyer case, 36 Decs. Comp. Gen. 809, 816 (1957).
65. "Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose." Gertrude Stein, Sacred Emily.
66. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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executive agency or GAO will fall into the human error, which the
advancement of the government-by-law doctrine was designed to avoid,
of conjuring up some other basis, such as the qualified products analogy
used by GAO-which is unwarranted, not only because it violates the
doctrine but because it actually is not analogous. There is a vast difference
between regulations which provide ample time for competing businesses
to demonstrate their entitlement to receive a copy of the formal advertise-
ment of the Government's needs-as was involved in the GAO decision
on qualified products, and a procurement method requiring an admin-
istrative determination that it is impossible to obtain competition by
formal advertising-as was importantly involved, but not mentioned,
in the GAO decision in the Fairchild case. While the procedure in both
cases restricted competition, that was2 not the basic legal issue in Fair-
child, notwithstanding the fact that the GAO decision treated it as the
sole legal tissue. The basic legal issues in the Fairchild case were whether
the procurement method used was authorized by law and whether the
facts showed that the procurement determinations had been made in
good faith. The decision failed to state this, and in attempting to negate
the issue as Fairchild presented it, GAO overlooked the real issues and
the need to resolve them by relating them to applicable law. These
failures were not mitigated by the decision's references to the views of
HASC on the method involved and, in view of the infringement of the
rule-of-law doctrine involved, the case was no occasion for GAO to
confine itself to the issue presented by Fairchild. HASC's views are in
the same category as the GAO decision. Both are in direct conflict with
the government-by-law doctrine.
GAO referred to the circumstance that "specifications are not suffi-
ciently definitive to permit full and free competition without negotiation
[discussion] as to the technical aspects of the requirement to obtain
an acceptable basis of understanding between the individual bidders and
the Government."6 It also referred to the need for officials to achieve
their evaluation and consummate their commitments within their time
limitations. Such circumstances disclose no facts related to any of the
clauses of exception, with the possible exception of clause (10): im-
practicability (impossibility) of obtaining competition (by formal
advertising).6 Actually, the facts presented in the GAO decision fail to
qualify the Fairchild case for the use of clause (10). The legislative
history contemplated that clause (10) should be used when it is "im-
possible" 9 to draft specifications, whereas the effect of the GAO decision
67. 40 Decs. Comp. Gen. 40, 41 (1960).
68. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (10) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
69. S. Rep. No. 1900, supra note 46, at 11-12.
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is to permit its use merely on a showing that the specifications were
not in fact drafted, without regard to whether it was possible to draft
them. It is no secret that administrative failure to have specifications
drafted is not always justified. Only the facts relied upon could show
whether that failure in the Fairchild case was justified and whether
the determination not to use the formal advertising method required by
law was made in good faith. GAO's failure to mention those facts or
to relate the decision to them in any way is completely contrary to its
insistence on a formal advertising possibility determination in every
procurement before attempting to use one of the seventeen exceptions."0
The case is another example of the fact that GAO is not fulfilling its
commitment and statutory obligation7' to find the facts, and to report
them when they fail to show good faith in procurement determinations.
Also, in another important respect GAO again did not relate its rationale
to applicable law. GAO's reference to "time limitations" as a justifica-
tion for the procurement action was hot related to any law permitting
consideration of such limitations. When the decision issued, time was
a permissible consideration only when related to a public exigency which
requires immediate performance. That was not shown to be the situation
in that case. Therefore the GAO rationale is untenable.
If the purpose of the procedure designated as "two-step formal
advertising" rather than by the more accurate term, "two-step negotiated
procurement," is to definitize the specifications-as GAO indicated in
the Fairchild decision-full and free competition, required by law,
would seem to demand that once the specifications have become definite
on the first step of the procedure, the Government have the privilege of
accepting the bid of any one approved in the pre-award survey or by a
certificate of competency.72 There is no indication that the procedure has
eliminated either the pre-award survey or certificates of competency. A
pre-award survey very conceivably might disclose that a firm qualifying
on the first step should be excluded, and that another firm, too busy with
other work at the time of the proceedings under the first step, was emi-
nently qualified to perform on the basis of the specifications produced at
that time, and at a price substantially below all other competitors. The
law or the logic on which GAO and HASC deprive the Government of the
more economical source is not apparent. What seems most apparent is
that both are unwittingly developing a foundation for more potential
70. See pp. 416-18 supra.
71. See 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. §§ 53-54 (1958); 60 Stat. 837 (1946), 31 U.S.C.
§§ 59, 60 (1958); S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947).
72. 72 Stat. 389 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 637 (1958), as amended, 15 U.C. § 637(d)-(e)
(Supp. IV, 1963).
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sole source purchases, for they do not indicate that the nonparticipating
first-step sources would have an opportunity to bid on any subsequent
purchase; and it might become not uncommon for an opportunist-
participant to eliminate the other participants by an under-cost bid
in order to gain a monopoly position after the first purchase.
It is thus appropriate at this point to consider generally the matter of
procurement without competition, and then to proceed to certain specific
factors mitigating against obtaining the competition required by law.
These factors include legislative-approved devices such as compulsory
discussions and "truth-in-contracting" certificates, which result in the
submission of something much less than a firm proposal and therefore
eliminate the sharpness of competition normally engendered by the
knowledge that an offer may be accepted upon receipt by the Government.
Other factors are competition lost by misuse of exceptions to applicable
law, such as exceptions (11) and (14) to the formal advertising rule,
and restrictions on the solicitation of bids and proposals, as in set-aside
procurements, which result in something less than the fdness of competi-
tion required by law. But first, procurement without competition.
IV. PROCUREMENT WITHOUT COMPETITION-UNAUTHORIZED
BY LAW
Officials in both the executive and the legislative branches of the Gov-
ernment, including GAO, are in agreement that competition is required
in negotiated procurement.73 No record has been found to show that any
official has ever cited any general authority in law to warrant procure-
ment without competition. The law removes formality only in the means
by which public procurement for the national government is achieved."4
The requirement of competition remains, since the law expressly recog-
nizes no exception in the case of negotiated procurement, and GAO has
held that formal advertising should be used rather than prior experience,
or hearsay or opinion, to establish whether any competition exists, before
using the impracticability exception to formal advertising." Nevertheless,
while responsible officials in both the executive and the legislative
branches of the Government pay lip service to the fact that competition
is required by law, and periodically express concern that there is not
73. H.R. Doc. No. 42, Hearings on H.R. 7995 and H.R. 8499 Before the House Commit-
tee on Armed Services, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3274, 5091 (1956); Hearings on Procurement,
supra note 43, at 148; Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense,
supra note 34, at 406.
74. General Services Administration, Federal Supply Service, Reg. Chap. 8, p. 36. See also
GSA Reg. 1-11-211.05.
75. See decisions cited note 42 supra.
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more competition in procurement, they appear to make no effort to chal-
lenge the legality of, or to take exception to, payments made pursuant to
awards specifically acknowledged as having been made without competi-
tion, and therefore in contravention of law. Whatever the explanation, we
find GAO, notwithstanding its acknowledgment that the Armed Services
Procurement Act waived only formal advertising,7" suggesting that under
the law purchases not exceeding $2,500 may be made without any com-
petition but failing to cite any law authorizing such procurement without
competition, 77 raising no question concerning weapon system procure-
ment procedures generally, which involve no competitive purchases, 8
or concerning weapon system procurement without competition if re-
quired system deliveries will be delayed 79 and reporting a noncompetitive
purchase of a radar system as unviolative of statute or regulation." We
further find GAO reporting noncompetitive purchases of oscillators
without noting the violation of law involved,81 failing to point out the
contravention of law involved in the Collins Radio case where the pur-
chase was without competition, 82 and failing to remind the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, in April
1960, that there was no law authorizing the Army to award a contract
to Fruehauf for 500 vehicles, without competition, either for lack of
drawings or for any other reason.8
Also, without advising Congress that such procurement involves an-
other example of purchasing without competition, in contravention of
law, GAO reported and testified at great length on the evils of sole source
procurement of over a billion dollars of aeronautical replacement spare
parts, where failure to use competitive buying increased the cost to the
Government by about fifty per cent.84 It was GAO's duty to inform
Congress of the legal basis of the purchases which increased the cost to
the taxpayer by about a half billion dollars and, if none existed, as is the
fact, so to inform Congress. GAO stated that with few exceptions, the
76. Hearings on H.R. 7995 and H.R. 8499, supra note 73, at 5091 (1956).
77. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 26, at 306-07.
78. Id. at 305.
79. Hearings on Military Procurement Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Small Business, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 401 (1960).
80. S. Rep. No. 4, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1961).
81. Id. at 16.
82. Hearings and Report on Navy Department Procurement of AN/PRC-41 Radio Sets
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
131-32 (1962).
83. Hearings on S. 1084 and S. 1176 Before a Subcommittee on the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 173-74 (1961).
84. Hearings on Sole Source Procurement, supra note 53, pt. 1, at 872.
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procurements were negotiated under the authority contained in 10 U.S.C.§ 2304(a) (10).8' But that section provides no authority for not obtaining
competition. GAO's failure to state that the purchases were illegal implies
that GAO construes section 2304(a) (10) as authority to waive competi-
tion, whereas it is merely one of seventeen exceptions permitting a waiver
of formal advertising only. Moreover, GAO's references in its report to
"little effort to find or develop competitive sources of supply" and to
"unnecessary noncompetitive procurement""0 suggest that section 2304
(a) (10) was not applied in good faith. This suggestion is further fortified
by the fact that the GAO report failed to show that the determinations
of sole source were based upon the results of formal advertising rather
than on speculation. GAO has held many times that such determinations
must not be based upon speculation.87 Yet it failed to associate those
decisions with its sole source report. GAO should have advised Congress
as to whether the agency determinations were or were not made in good
faith, as Congress expected GAO to do 8 and as GAO long before its
report promised to do."9
Also, GAO should have advised Congress of another act, enacted at the
same time as the Armed Services Procurement Act,0 which authorizes the
secretary of any military department to buy designs, aircraft, airplane
parts and aeronautical accessories considered necessary for experimental
purposes, "with or without competition and by contract or otherwise,"
and to contract for procurement of any of those items in quantity without
competition."- GAO gave Congress the erroneous impression that the
Armed Services Procurement Act is the only law to be considered with
respect to the procurements involved. By not informing Congress, as it
is obligated by statute to do, as to whether it found the procurements to
be in contravention of law, or that it could not determine whether they
were in contravention of law, together with its reasons, GAO indicated
that it actually made no effort to discharge its statutory responsibility to
determine whether contraventions of law occurred in the use of the tenth
exception. If some or many of the procurements reported by GAO qual-
ified as noncompetitive procurement under 10 U.S.C. § 2274, the fact
that the purchasing officer cited the tenth exception to 10 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a), rather than 10 U.S.C. § 2274, would not render invalid any
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 872.
87. See decisions cited note 42 supra.
88. S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947).
89. Id. at 26.
90. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-57 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304-11 (Supp. IV, 1963).
91. 10 U.S.C. § 2274 (1958).
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which qualified under 10 U.S.C. § 2274. Since it was GAO's duty to
determine the legality of the purchases and report its conclusion to Con-
gress, it also was its duty to consider 10 U.S.C. § 2274 and to report
to Congress its evaluation of the purchases in the light of 10 U.S.C.
§ 2274. It clearly did not constitute responsible reporting to fail to relate
the report in any way to 10 U.S.C. § 2274, and it was clearly in contempt
of government by law as well as of its statutory duty for GAO to fail to
state whether the law had been violated.
In the case of the M-1 13 personnel carrier, referred to in the sole source
procurement hearings, GAO, whose statutory duty is to insist on com-
petition in all procurement unless authority to procure without competi-
tion is provided by law, stated that it "seems inconsistent ...to then
go out and get competition" where exception (16) is used. It seems
inconsistent for GAO to suggest that it is inconsistent to observe the law.
Also, logically as well as legally, it would appear consistent to seek
competition. It is in the Government's interest to have the same ad-
vantages of selection and of sources competing against each other as
it has in other procurement situations. The fact that unlimited competi-
tion raises a question of good faith in not using formal advertising does
not alter the lack of authority to make procurements without any com-
petition. GAO did not state, and no one asked GAO to state, the authority
it relied upon in suggesting that procurement under exception (16) may
be made without competition. Since such authority does not exist, such
a suggestion by GAO would seem to encourage more procurement without
competition.
Such a GAO posture may account for the Navy's over-simplification
of the matter of noncompetitive procurement, as reported in the Federal
Bar News. The substance of the report indicates that the Navy indulges
in noncompetitive procurement on a large scale because of its conviction
that it is only human to deal with an older, proved source of supply in
order to assure quality and timely delivery and to save effort and expense,
or where specifications, drawings and technical data are not available for
more than one source of supply. 8 The Department appears unconcerned
that the law provides no authority to purchase without competition and
that therefore its rationale of the matter, especially its reliance on the
"human nature element" rather than on the law, is the antithesis of the
rule of law which Congress declares.
The error in the GAO position in the case of the M-113 personnel
carriers is not limited to the foregoing. It is important at this time to
refer briefly to another error. In the same hearings in which GAO ap-
92. Hearings on Sole Source Procurement, supra note 53, at 1003.
93. Federal Bar News, Nov. 1961, p. 284.
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peared to construe the law authorizing exceptions to formal advertising,
as exceptions to the competition requirement, GAO sent a letter to the
hearing chairman construing the same law as providing an exception
to the law which requires the use of Government-owned facilities. GAO
advised the chairman that 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(16)
authorizes the Secretary of the Army to negotiate a contract with a particular supplier
in the interest of national defense and industrial mobilization, notwithstanding the
existence of other private or Government-owned production facilities.94
GAO therefore concluded that 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(16) supersedes 10
U.S.C. § 4532(a), and "that contracts negotiated under 10 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a)(16) may be regarded as authorized exceptions to the pro-
visions of 10 U.S.C. § 4532(a)."'I GAO dearly is in error. 10 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a) (16) is only an authorized exception to the law requiring that
procurement shall be made by formal advertising. It relates only to a
method of procurement, whereas 10 U.S.C. § 4532 (a) relates to the source
of procurement. The method becomes involved only after it has been de-
termined that the supplies to be procured cannot be produced "on an
economical basis" and "in factories or arsenals owned by the United
States." Thus there is no basis for GAO's conclusions as to 10 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a) (16), and to describe it as GAO has only adds to the existing
abundant confusion about negotiated procurement.
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that GAO and Congress are
badly confused and are each pursuing conflicting courses with respect to
competition in procurement is the enactment of Public Law 87-305V1
Only ten days after the enactment of Public Law 87-65311 as a means of
obtaining more competition in procurement, Congress enacted 87-305.
GAO had raised no question on one of the sections involving procure-
ment." It is clear that section 8 furnishes the executive agencies a basis
for concluding that a waiver of competition is authorized in many pro-
curements, because the section patently is based upon a theory that
competition is not required in the ten circumstances enumerated in that
section. 9 Thus, by their failure to perceive the effect of section 8, GAO
94. Hearings on Sole Source Procurement, supra note 53, at 1267.
95. Id. at 1268.
96. 75 Stat. 666 (1961), 15 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. IV, 1963).
97. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a), (g), 2306(f), 2310(b), 2311 (Supp. IV, 1963).
98. Hearings on S. 836 Before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 87th Cong,
1st Sess., at 47-49 (1961).
99. "[P]rocurements (1) which for security reasons are of a clasified nature, or (2)
which involve perishable subsistence supplies, or (3) which are for utility services and the
procuring agency in accordance with applicable law has predetermined the utility concern
to whom the award will be made, or (4) which are of such unusual and compelling
emergency that the Government would be seriously injured if bids or offers were permitted
1964]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and Congress have unwittingly established a means for making innumer-
able and varied procurements without competition, at practically the
same time they were declaring great anxiety over the volume of noncom-
petitive procurement and advancing 87-653 as necessary to reduce the
volume.
Other indications that GAO's policies are operating at cross-purposes
are its promulgation and endorsement of standard forms which preclude,
without authority of law, the use of competition and firm offers,10 while
at the same time it associates itself with those who declare no law
authorizing any purchase without competition and declare the urgent
need for much more competition and greater adherence to rule by law l
The existence of the forms involved is a contravention of law in itself.
Yet they were promulgated and endorsed by the very office required to
report contravention of law to Congress.
Disregard of the law and failure to enforce it because certain indi-
viduals in the executive and legislative branches of the Government
believe the law is improper or inadequate is the very antithesis of govern-
ment by law. It seems clear that no single failure to enforce the rule of
law in procurement matters is more responsible for other failures in
such matters than the failure to enforce the law requiring competition in
all procurement and to come to grips with the question of just what
exceptions are justified. It is an open invitation to waive formal advertis-
ing, which is designed to secure competition, and to resort to negotiated
procurement, on the theory that the law does not require competition in
the latter method of procurement. It is also an open invitation to make
excessive use of exception (10) as a justification for sole source procure-
ment without regard to the fact that the context in which exception (10)
appears in the act makes it clear that it refers to impracticability (impos-
sibility) of obtaining competition by formal advertising, since it is stated
as an exception to formal advertising and not as an exception to the law
requiring competition. Failure to enforce the law requiring competition
is also a natural inducement to experiment with what has become known
to be made more than 15 days after the issuance of the invitation for bids or solicitation
for proposals, or (5) which are made by an order placed under an existing contract, or
(6) which are made from another Government department or agency, or a mandatory
source of supply, or (7) which are for personal or professional services, or (8) which are
for services from educational institutions, or (9) in which only foreign sources are to be
solicited, or (10) for which it is determined in writing by the procuring agency, with
the concurrence of the Administrator, that advance publicity is not appropriate or reason-
able." 75 Stat. 668 (1961), 15 U.S.C. § 637(e) (Supp. IV, 1963). Most of the circumstances
have no basis in prior law for waiving competition.
100. H.R. Rep. No. 1224, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 13, 15 (1951); Standard Form No.
1143a, 7 GAO 5200.
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as the weapon system procurement method, which has been shown tq
include noncompetitive as well as competitive procurement. Further, such
failure encourages the procurement of research and development work
under exception (11) without obtaining competition, which in turn places
the Government in the position of not being able to secure competition
in the ultimate production contract. This situation is developed in more
detail in a later part of this article.
If, notwithstanding its declarations on the matter, GAO actually be-
lieves that the law, without reference to Public Law 87-653, authorizes
procurement without competition, and thereby relieves it from any
obligation to take exception to payment made pursuant to awards without
competition, Congress and the public should be informed of that belief
and of its source in law, if any. If the Armed Services Committees do not
share the GAO belief, they should explain how they justify GAO's prac-
tice of not declaring noncompetitive procurement to be in contravention
of law. It is a mockery of logic for GAO and those committees to expect
the public to take seriously their declarations of interest in increasing
competition in public procurement if they fail to furnish forthright
answers to these questions.
The problem of reconciling official declarations of desire to restore the
rule of law and to secure more competition in procurement, with official
approval of express disregard of the law requiring competition in all
procurement is compounded by the GAO-HASC legislative proposal,
which was included in the enacted amendatory bill H.R. 5532 and which,
it is said, will increase the use of competitive procurement:
In all negotiated procurements in excess of $2500 in which rates or prices are not
fixed by law or regulation and in which time of delivery ill permit, proposals shall
be solicited from the maximum number of qualified sources consistent with the nature
and requirements of the supplies or services to be procured .... 101
The law prior to Public Law 87-653 conferred no general authority
upon procurement officials to obtain less than "consistent," "maximum"
competition in procurement actions merely because of "time of delivery,"
or for any other reason. The prior law only waived the procurement of
such competition by formal advertising if the procurement qualified under
one of the seventeen exceptions to that method of procurement. If the
procurement so qualified and the negotiated method was used, it was still
necessary under prior law to solicit "maximum" competition. Thus,
instead of increasing competition, as it has been represented to do, Public
Law 87-653 decreases competition by requiring less than was required
before its enactment. Also, in none of the seventeen exceptions to the
101. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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competition-by-formal-advertising requirement expressly provided by law
can GAO and HASC find any authority to purchase without formal
advertisements for competition merely because of "time of delivery.' n0
Only under the circumstances of a public exigency requiring immediate
delivery and not permitting of the delay incident to formal advertising
does the law permit a waiver of formal advertising; 103 but even in that
situation the law before Public Law 87-653 provided no authority to
purchase without "consistent," "maximum" competition. The mere fact
that time of delivery would not permit the use of formal advertising was
and remains insufficient to waive formal advertising. 0 4 The necessary
circumstance is a public exigency requiring immediate delivery or per-
formance. 105 Under Public Law 87-653, however, once a procurement
qualifies under the public exigency exception to formal advertising,
procurement officials no longer are required to solicit "consistent,"
"'maximum" competition. Nor are they required to solicit such competi-
tion under any of the other sixteen exceptions to the formal advertising
requirement if "time of delivery" will not permit. In view of the fore-
going and of the recognized abuse of the "urgency" excuse by executive
agencies over the years, 0 6 it remains for the sponsors to explain how the
new law accomplishes the GAO-HASC objective of increasing competi-
tion, or the HASC objective of restoring the rule of law to defense
procurement.
Undismayed by the inconsistencies in declaring their intention of re-
storing the rule of law, including competitive purchasing, while at the
same time failing to report as contraventions of law purchases made
without competition, GAO and HASC would add further roadblocks to
genuine competition by having the law require that written or oral dis-
cussions be conducted with all responsible offerors who submit proposals
within a competitive range, price and other factors considered. Some
analysis is demanded of the attempts to achieve that requirement.
V. COMPULSORY DISCUSSIONS IN LIEu OF Fnm BIDS
Cases of record0 7 show the problems inherent in discussions with
bidders after receipt of bids and the importance of maintaining the
102. Exception (14) provides for only undue delay in procurement.
103. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (2) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
104. To waive it for that reason is to ignore the express language in the applicable law.
105. 38 Decs. Comp. Gen. 171, 173 (1958).
106. Hearings on S. 1084 and S. 1176, supra note 83, at 176.
107. 31 Decs. Comp. Gen. 378 (1952); Committee Print, Report on Study of Armed
Services Procurement Act, Title 10 U.S.C. Chapter 137, by Special Investigations Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Proceedings No. 3, 85th
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Government's bargaining position through observance of the law requiring
solicitation of firm offers in the first instance. Notwithstanding those
problems, GAO and HASC reactivated in the Eighty-sixth and again
in the Eighty-seventh Congress the controversy, which had appeared
settled by the exchange of correspondence with GAO in 1957,10s with
respect to the administrative regulation permitting acceptance of a
bidder's initial offer without further discussion.l °9 GAO first proposed
legislation which would require discussions with all bidders in the lowest
price range and, with limited exception, to prohibit acceptance of any
offer without further discussion:
In all negotiated procurements in excess of $2500 in which rates or prices are not fixed
by law or regulation and in which time of delivery will permit, proposals shall be
solicited from the maximum of qualified sources consistent with the nature and re-
quirements of the supplies or services to be procured and written or oral discussions
shall be conducted with all responsible offerors who submit proposals within a compe-
titive range, price and other factors considered: Provided, however, That the require-
ments of this subsection with respect to written or oral discussions need not be
applied to procurements in implementation of authorized set-aside programs.110
The Department of Defense objected to the requirement of written
or oral discussions. It expressed the view that such a requirement would
preclude award from being made on the basis of the initial proposals
without written or oral discussions even in situations where a substantial
number of clearly competitive and responsible proposals have been
obtained and where the contracting officer is satisfied that the most
favorable proposal is fair and reasonably priced. Such an inflexible
requirement in law, said the Department, could have a result not in the
best interests of the Government in that it would be "an open invitation
to offerors not to quote their best prices initially because of a statutory
requirement that there be bargaining in every procurement.""'
Such a procedure as that proposed by GAO would reduce requests for
Cong., 1st Sess., at 644-48 (1957), in which proposals were said to have been solicited on a
"competitive basis" but in which it appears doubtful that the Government obtained genuine
competition, since the procurement agency reported that the proposals were submitted with
the distinct understanding that they were subject to withdrawal at any time; and the M-3
air conditioner case with respect to which HASC itself declared the whole procedure open
to serious question. Id. at 648-51.
108. Hearings Before the Special Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, under authority of H.R. Res. 112, Study of Armed Services Procurement
Regulations, Sections 1-605 and 2-302 and Navy Procurement Directive 3-002.1, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 3273-74 (1956).
109. Id. at 3259.
110. H.R. 12572, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
111. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense Before a Special
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 643 (1960).
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price proposals to requests for price information and would perpetuate
the GAO-McShain rationale," 2 which destroys the important option
position of the Government in negotiated procurement, desired by such
members of HASC as Congressman Kilday. 11 It would compel negotia-
tion upward as well as downward." 4 It would prolong the consummation
of a contract and would not produce the full and free competition re-
quired by law. Obviously, if bidders know they can equivocate on the
prices submitted, there can be little, if any, of the genuine competition
which the Government is obligated by law to secure in the public
interest."' GAO stated that it felt that "when the offerors come in with
their offers, . . . at least they should be given a second chance, or ...
some discussion should be had with them, to see if they might not give
the Government a better price, or a better contract." '  It has been said
that there is no question of courtesy in such public matters, and that
there is involved only a question of right and duty." 7 The duty is plain.
The Government has no right to abort the traditional competitive
process of securing the benefit of the sharp competition engendered by
the solicitation of firm prices. It has no authority in law to make a game
of the serious business of public procurement, and to expose itself and
the public purse to the artifices, caprices and whims obviously invited
by binding itself to give those with whom it must bargain a second chance.
112. That notwithstanding (1) the lack of any law authorizing any representative of
the Government to solicit other than a firm bid, under the circumstances of the case, and the
lack of any documentary evidence that the Government sought anything but a firm proposal,
(2) the McShain unqualified promise in its firm proposal, to execute a more formal contract
in 30 days after opening, and (3) McShain's pressing for acceptance of its proposal until
termination of a prior contract on which it bad depended to reduce its costs-informal
advice by the Government, at a conference before submission of proposals, that negotiations
would be conducted with the three lowest bidders to determine the final conditions and
price, transformed a form proposal into mere price information, subject to increase or
decrease by the contractor (McShain) at its option. 31 Decs. Comp. Gen. 378 (1952). The
later decision on the case in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, United
States v. John McShain, Inc., 258 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1958), demonstrates that the facts
failed to support the GAO conclusions and the error in the meaning of negotiation as Implied
in the GAO decision. While the court subsequently failed to question a contrary jury verdict
in the district court to which the case was remanded, United States v. John McShain, Inc.,
288 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the errors of the GAO decision remain on the basis of the
facts before GAO as discussed in its decision.
113. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 111,
at 717.
114. An inevitable result of treating proposals as something other than firm.
115. See note 107 supra; H.R. Doc. No. 66, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6027-28 (1960) ; United
States v. Warne, 190 F. Supp. 645, 655-56 (1960).
116. Hearings on Procurement Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 160 (1960).
117. Proceedings, supra note 107, at 651.
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It has fully adequate authority under existing law to reject any and all
proposals, for price or for other reasons, and if it needs the advice of the
trade to assist it in determining a reasonable price, it should seek price
information as such before requesting proposals. Rather than law based
upon the theory that offerors "should be given a second chance," as pro-
posed by GAO, it appears manifest that what is needed is uniformity in
understanding that the Government has the right and duty to offer
bidders another chance if the prices offered are not in the best interests
of the Government-and only in those circumstances.
Since bidders would not be required to commit themselves to follow
through on their quotations (price information), a law unqualifiedly
compelling discussions"" would encourage some bidders to attempt arbi-
trarily to submit bids low enough to place them in the lowest price range
where they would be entitled to a discussion. Or, being sufficiently well
acquainted with the price potentialities of the item involved to be certain
of being within the lowest price range, such bidders would be encouraged
to quote prices padded sufficiently to allow concessions at the negotiation
table and yet be reasonably certain of being the lowest bidder at a price
still above the most economical and just price for the Government. The
vulnerability and destructive effects of the GAO proposal are mitigated
little, if any, by the coordinated effort in that direction with the Depart-
ment of Defense, which produced revised language as a part of the
amendment to existing law, enacted on September 10, 1962:
(c) Section 2304 is amended by adding a new subsection as follows:
"(g) In all negotiated procurements in excess of $2,500 in which rates or prices are
not fixed by law or regulation and in which time of delivery will permit, proposals
shall be solicited from the maximum number of qualified sources consistent with the
nature and requirements of the supplies or services to be procured, and written or oral
discussions shall be conducted with all responsible offerors who submit proposals within
a competitive range, price, and other factors considered: Provided, however, That the
requirements of this subsection with respect to written or oral discussions need not be
applied to procurements in implementation of authorized set-aside programs or to
procurements where it can be clearly demonstrated fron the existence of adequate
competition or accurate prior cost experience with the product, that acceptance of an
initial proposal without discussion would result in fair and reasonable prices and where
the request for proposals notifies all offerors of the possibility that award may be made
without discussion."119
The italicized language of the proviso is dearly intended to meet the
objections of the Department of Defense to compulsory discussions2 0
118. Such as GAO attempted but failed to have enacted.
119. Pub. L. 87653, § 1(c) (1962), codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (Supp. IV, 1963).
(Emphasis added.)
120. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 111,
at 721-22.
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while attempting at the same time to enact into law GAO's recommenda-
tion. However, as to actually fulfilling GAO's recommendation of com-
pulsory discussions or altering the status quo as it existed prior to the
amendment, the new subsection, like most other parts of the amendment,
is for the most part an illusion. The Department. of Defense does not
appear to have been given any limitation on the solicitation of firm
offers in all cases or on placing all its potential offerors on notice that
discussions in any procurement are at its option .21 For it can never
determine whether competition is, in the language of the proviso, "ade-
quate," until it opens all proposals received. Therefore, it can under
the amendment, and should, always place offerors on notice "that
award may be made without competition." GAO itself has declared
that the Government cannot speculate but must solicit to determine the
extent of competition," and the Department's testimony shows that its
determination of adequacy is made after it receives the proposals solic-
ited,1 28 rather than on the basis of its information on available competition
known at the time it prepares its request for proposals. Therefore, not
only did prior law not confer authority to solicit anything less than a
firm bid, which would justify such procurement action, but subsection
(c) of the new law cannot be construed to contain such authority. And
there are other aspects to be noted which show a number of weaknesses
in the language used to describe the circumstances excepted from the
discussion requirement.
Since both GAO and HASC acknowledge that the decision as to which
bids are "within a competitive range" should be "left to the contracting
officer,' 24 and since other factors in addition to price influence the deci-
sion, the subsection seems as pointless as it appeared in the bill stage
to three members of the hearing subcommittee-including the chairman,
who expressed this view clearly. 125 One member stated the opinion "we
are doing a lot of talking about a lot of nothing.' 12 1 "So we wind up
pretty much where we are, anyway."'' 27 Such views appear very per-
suasive when considered in the further light of pertinent portions of the
DOD regulation which would implement that subsection of the new law.
It provides that "award of a contract may be properly influenced by the
121. The option privilege of the Government is of the essence in firm offers.
122. 41 Decs. Comp. Gen. 484, 490 (1962); 39 id. 566 (1960); 37 id. 524 (1958); 30
id. 34 (1950); 27 id. 737 (1947); 23 id. 395 (1943); 18 id. 578 (1939); 16 id. 318 (1936).
123. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 111,
at 652-55.
124. Id. at 717.
125. Id. at 717-18.
126. Id. at 716.
127. Id. at 718.
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proposal which promises the greatest value to the Government in terms
of possible performance, ultimate productibility, growth potential and
other factors rather than the proposal offering the lowest price or probable
cost and fixed fee."' 28 It seems crystal clear that the regulation permits
consideration of so many different and speculative "other factors," as
referred to in subsection (c), that the contracting officer may continue,
as before the enactment of subsection (c), to deal with a very restricted
number of bidders, even but one or two, despite what the sponsors of the
subsection may have hoped to accomplish by the requirement to deal with
"all ... within a competitive range." Irrespective of how many bidders
may have proposed prices "within a competitive range," the permissible
"other factors" are so broad, indefinite and speculative in character as to
negate the advantages of fair competition to both the contractor and the
Government, traditionally sought by such estimation of the Government's
needs as will assure a uniform, nonarbitrary evaluation of all proposals
solicited. Regardless of whether or not the procurement is one which may,
or should, 9 be the subject of proper specification, the regulation permits
such broad discretion in evaluation of the proposals as to permit new
specifications to be imposed after receipt of proposals, arbitrarily, without
uniformity, and in such manner as to exclude many, if not most, from
the "competitive range." But most important, on the constructive side,
the wide discretion permitted by the regulation allows the contracting
officer to accept a bid or proposal without any discussion, and thus makes
it clear that all requests for proposals should seek firm bids. But the
Armed Service Procurement Regulation shows that the Defense Depart-
ment is construing subsection (c) of the new law as doing precisely what
the Department indicated in the hearings and reports preceding its
enactment 3 -- placing a restriction on the solicitation of firm bids. If
GAO and HASC had repudiated the Department's position, as should
have been done in the legislative history, 3' the Department would have
no basis for its omission from the regulation of a statement that all
solicitations for proposals shall notify the offerors of the possibility that
award may be made without discussion. Since firm bids are the spark of
genuine competition, this is a most serious deficiency in the regulation,
and such subcommittee members as Congressman Kilday 3 2 should insist
128. Armed Services Procurement Reg. 3-805.1(d), 32 C.F.R. 3.808-1(d) (1961).
129. It is common knowledge that frequently there is no persuasive justification for
the failure to have specifications.
130. 107 Cong. Rec. 1655-57 (1961).
131. Both should have made it dear to DOD that the subsection could only affect the
procedure after solicitation and receipt of proposals.
132. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 111,
at 717.
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that the regulation be revised to require solicitation of firm bids in all
procurement. This would still not interfere with whatever GAO accom-
plished in the new law, if anything, with respect to compelling discussions,
and would at the same time bring the regulations in line with the law as
it is and always has been with respect to the solicitation of firm bids as
a sine qua non of the legal requirement of competition in public procure-
ment. Since the GAO does not report failure to have competition in pro-
curement as contravention of law, it is not to be expected that that Office
will make any report on DOD's failure to solicit firm bids as a con-
travention of law.
Other indications that the "merits" of the new subsection are illusory
appear in GAO's testimony on the principal portion of the subsection. It
shows that notwithstanding the fact that GAO authored the language,
it had no formula in mind to determine whether proposals are "within a
competitive range,"'133 and that it had no definition of "responsible
offerors."' 34 With no understanding of its own language, it is not clear
how GAO expects to have any uniformity in its audit of the new amend-
ment or how it can fulfill its statutory obligation to report to Congress
contraventions of law with respect to the amendment.
What, then, is GAO's justification for representing that compulsory
discussions will produce more of the kind of competition which the
Government should have, and that it is possible to achieve it without
subjecting the Government to procurement evils in the process? It has
cited no cases which Congress could embrace as proving GAO's pro-
posal meritorious. 135 It thus remains for GAO and HASC to cite any
advantage to be gained by compulsory discussions, and to furnish the
facts on which they have determined that those advantages "clearly and
133. Hearings on H.R. 5532 Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1962).
134. Id. at 63.
135. In an apparent effort to convince one doubtful subcommittee member of the sound-
ness of its proposal to require discussions with bidders (and thus prohibit solicitation of firm
offers), GAO finally related the facts of a case, Hearings on Procurement Practices of the
Department of Defense, supra note 111, at 721-23, which it considered illustrative of the
need of adopting its propsal. But the procedure in that case provides no facts to establish
the wisdom or the validity of the GAO proposal. Therefore, the member appeared unim-
pressed. GAO seemed to be attempting to legislate competence or good judgment which,
as one subcommittee member stated, "you just cannot do." Id. at 723. Unless consideration of
all the facts, which GAO did not appear to have assembled, compelled a conclusion that the
administrative estimate was not accurate and valid, GAO's argument for a discussion to
obtain the price on the negotiated bid, which was 77 below that estimate, does not appear
persuasive. The full facts might demonstrate knowledge by the contracting officer that the
negotiated bid must be in error and that acceptance of it would only result in allegation of
error in bid, or default.
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convincingly" exceed the disadvantages, including the detriment to the
Government's bargaining position resulting from not requesting firm price
proposals, price padding, unfair and irresponsible competition, secrecy,
and substitution of individual responsibility for the rule of law. Con-
sideration of another illusory part of the new law is now in order.
VI. ILLUSIONS IN SU3SECTION (e)-THE "TRUTH-IN-NEGOTIATING
CERTIFICATE"
1 36
Subsection (e) of the new law provides that a prime contractor shall
be required, prior to the award of any negotiated prime contract in excess
of $100,000, to certify that to the best of his knowledge and belief, the
cost or pricing, data he submitted was accurate, complete and current.?7
But it is to be noted that the subsection does not require the contractor
to furnish a certification in support of his cost or pricing data at the
time he submits his proposal, or to agree to furnish one if he is notified an
award will be made to him upon the submission of such certification.
The subsection only provides what he shall be "required" to do if he is
to be awarded the contract. Therefore, subsection (e) enables the con-
tractor (bidder) to avoid becoming contractually obligated to perform
pursuant to the offer contained in his proposal, as accepted by the
Government, by merely refusing to certify his data. In other words, the
subsection provides bidders with a means of withdrawing a bid which
was, or should have been, submitted for acceptance by the Government,
at the Government's option, when opened, without discussion, if the price
and other factors qualified it for such acceptance. Thus, the destruction
of firm bids is the "joker" in subsection (e), and it apparently was over-
looked in the legislative processing because of the abandon with which
both GAO, and HASC as a whole, treated the lack of any authority in
law to solicit other than firm bids. In view of such official indifference
toward the importance of firm bids, and under the present language of
subsection (e), the bidder need feel but mildly the pressures of com-
petition when he figures his bid price, because he knows that he will not
have to certify his cost data in support of that price, and that if and when
the Government finally decides to make the award to him, he may have
learned much about the other bid prices and decide to withdraw
or to alter his price considerably before certifying his cost data. Such
permissible equivocation by the bidder and the relief from the full pres-
sures of competition means, of course, that the Government is deprived
of the benefits which the law contemplates that the Government shall
136. 108 Cong. Rec. 9973 (1962) (remarks of Congressman Vinson).
137. Pub. L. 87-653, § 1(e) (1962), codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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derive from the existence of such pressures when the bidder is preparing
his response to the request for proposals.
The discrepancy between subsection (e) and the absence of authority
to solicit anything but a firm price, with the resultant diminution in
genuine competition for public procurement-in direct conflict with the
increased competition which the new law purportedly was to accomplish
-is not the only weakness in that subsection. As happened in the case
of subsection (c),' 38 the language contributed by DOD to subsection (e)
as an addition to the GAO language defeats its purpose. The views of
the subcommittee members that subsection (c) is pointless are equally
applicable to subsection (e), notwithstanding the value attributed to it
by the chairman;. 9 for like subsection (c), the proviso, confers such
broad discretion in applying the certification requirement as to render the
subsection substantially if not almost entirely ineffective. It provides that:
the requirements of this subsection need not be applied to contracts or subcontracts
where the price negotiated is based on adequate price competition, established catalog
or market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general
public, prices set by law or regulation or, in exceptional cases where the head of the
agency determines that the requirements of this subsection may be waived and states
in writing his reasons for such determination. 140
"Adequate competition" appears from the Regulation of the Department
to be that which produces "fair and reasonable prices calculated to result
in the lowest ultimate overall costs to the Government."'' But deter-
mination of the "lowest ultimate overall costs" is "left to the contracting
officer"142--even more so than determination of "competitive range"
under subsection (c)-because neither GAO or HASC appears to have
objected to the other pertinent part of the Regulation, which permits
consideration of cost to be influenced by such speculative matters as
"possible performance, ultimate productibility, growth potential and
other factors1 43 in addition to the actual price figure available. Since
GAO's procedure on auditable matters, in spite of its statutory respon-
sibility with respect to agency determinations, is not to review, evaluate
and report, because of its theory that it cannot overrule, it is clear that
the agencies involved have even less occasion to fear surveillance of their
138. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 111,
at 717-18.
139. Hearings on H.R. 5532, supra note 133, at 21-26.
140. Pub. L. 87-653, § 1 (e) (1962), codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (Supp. IV, 1963).
141. Armed Services Procurement Reg. 3-801.1(a), 32 C.F.R. § 3.801-1(a) (1963).
142. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note 111, at
717.
143. See note 128 supra.
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actions under subsection (e), so long as those actions may be taken on
the basis of the speculative matters above mentioned. And in view of the
tendency of procurement officials to exercise their exceptional authority
rather as the rule, these is little more that DOD could have added to the
GAO language to "wind [us] up pretty much where we [were] .... ,1 ,
Whether or not effective as enacted, subsection (e) is but another
example of attempts to add more law to fully adequate but unenforced
existing law. In effect it is an underwriting of executive and legislative
agency incompetency and inefficiency, in that it substitutes a document
to be issued by the contractor for the auditing and documentation re-
quired by law both before and since Public Law 87-653. Many if not most
of the cases to which the subcommittee chairman attributed the need for
subsection (e) 145 were cases in which the executive agency had made
little or no attempt to check the prices proposed by the contractors,
146
notwithstanding the fact that the agency could not therefore make a
proper determination, as required under 10 U.S.C. § 2306(b) and other
parts of the Armed Services Procurement Act. All that was and still is
needed is for GAO to discharge its statutory duty to review, evaluate
and report on those determinations and refuse to recognize those not
made in good faith.147 The burden would be and still is upon both the
executive agency and GAO to show that the agency determinations re-
quired by law are made in good faith, if the agency does not establish
for itself, without regard to the contractor's certification, that "the cost
or pricing data he submitted was accurate, complete and current." The
issue is as simple as that, and therefore the justification for the time and
expense of legislating subsection (e) remains as enigmatic as many other
aspects of procurement law enforcement. And since GAO and HASC
appear unaware of the ineffectiveness of the subsection for the purpose
for which they designed it, GAO and DOD presumably will continue to
ignore the law with respect to "good faith" executive agency determina-
tions.
The chairman of the House subcommittee which approved the sub-
section indicated on the House floor that Congress could stop the with-
holding of accurate, complete and current prices by requiring the securing
of the certificate provided for under subsection (e) and an audit of the
144. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense, supra note III,
at 718.
145. Hearings on H.R. 5532, supra note 133, at 16-18, 29.
146. See Hearings on Weapons System fanagement Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Armed Forces, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 346, 622 (1959).
147. Budget and Accounting Act, 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. §§ 53-54 (1958); S. Rep.
No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947).
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prices "before final payment."'148 But the chairman referred to no part of
the subsection or to any other part of the new law as requiring such an
audit. And he is very familiar with the fact that both the executive
agency's and the GAO's audits are very selective, covering as few as one
-per cent of all defense contracts in the case of GAO.14" But even if most
if not all of the contracts involved were audited, as the subcommittee
chairman, by his remark, intimated they would be, performance of the
audit at any time "before final payment," and thus not necessarily before
the Government committed itself to a contract, would mean that the head
of the agency would have no significant basis for the determination re-
quired by 10 U.S.C. § 2306(b), since he would be relying entirely on the
veracity and business acumen of the contractor. The contractor might
be truthful in his certification but at the same time may unwittingly have
made a considerable error in transposition of figures, or in some other
respect, or may not have been sufficiently thorough in determining
whether the data he furnished the Government actually was accurate,
complete and current. Against these deficiencies in the subsection (e) cer-
tificate the Government is provided no protection, because the contractor
certifies only "to the best of his knowledge and belief." The subsection
therefore leaves the Government completely unprotected from any con-
tractor who chooses, as an excuse, to rely on error, oversight, or the
general carelessness of his staff in investigating the reliability of price
data. Under existing law and procedures, that state of unprotection will
exist at least until final payment is to be made, and perhaps beyond that
time, either because of the long period of time frequently occurring
before final payment which may make it virtually impossible to check
the contractor's veracity or because the audit is so selective that no
representative of the Government ever attempts to make such a check.
With such audit selectivity and with so many exceptions to excuse the
agency from obtaining the certificate, the subcommittee chairman's state-
ment of the great value of subsection (e)-"When it is law, no contract
will be enforcible without it"' 0 -clearly lacks persuasion. Audit selectiv-
ity alone obviously means that the enforcibility of practically all con-
tracts, and the contractors' legal entitlement to be paid from public funds,
are never questioned, and that therefore there are many requirements in
the law that may be ignored without fear by both contractor and execu-
tive agency. As bad as the Government's situation is, where such an audit
at best takes place so long after the certification is proffered by the
contractor, it is still no more reassuring for the Government to con-
148. See note 136 supra.
149. Hearings on Weapons System Management, supra note 146, at 380.
150. 108 Cong. Rec. 9972 (1962) (remarks of Congressman Vinson).
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template the results that would be occasioned by an audit before accept-
ance of the certification and award, for in that event the Government's
almost simultaneous verification of the contractor's veracity might appear
unreasonably offensive to many contractors, and complicate contracting
relationships to the detriment of the Government.
In view of all of the deficiencies and weaknesses in subsection (e)
which have been noted there appears to be little justification for the
subcommittee chairman's description of it as "one of . . . [the] most
important provisions"' 51 of the bill which became Public Law 87-653.
Instead, what appears much more apropos is a statement made by him
some years before, that "sometimes in our anxiety to legislate,... we do
not accomplish what we seek to do," '52 and the remark of that other Con-
gressman who said, in connection with another legislative matter, "So all
we are doing ... is taking great credit to ourselves ... to the effect that
we are going to control this program... when in reality we are not.""
It appears that the same may be said of the ineffectiveness of Public
Law 87-653 to correct the misuse of exceptions (11) and (14) in Sec-
tion 2304(a) of the Armed Services Procurement Act.
VII. CONTRAVENTIONS OF LAW IN ExCEPTIONS (11) AND (14)
The Armed Services Procurement Act permits the procurement of ex-
perimental, developmental or research work, including design work,
without formal advertising but not without competition. 5 4 Therefore, if
the act is observed, awards of the same design work for the ultimate pro-
duction model will be made to several contractors.15 Such awards estab-
lish a number of contractors with the necessary experience and familiarity
to qualify as competitors for quantity production from the chosen model.
In other words, since there is no general law authorizing award of the
production contract without competition, those multiple awards for the
same design are the means to avoid contravention of law. But Congress
provided another clause which has been erroneously construed as author-
ity to solicit a contractor for quantity production, without competition,
despite the conflict of that construction with the express official view
that authority to negotiate is not authority to waive competition. That
clause only permitted a waiver of formal advertising where "formal ad-
vertising and competitive bidding might require duplication of invest-
151. Ibid.
152. 102 Cong. Rec. 2908 (1956) (remarks of Congressman Vinson).
153. 107 Cong. Rec. 17682 (1961) (remarks of Congressman Capehart).
154. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (11) (1958), as amended, 10 US.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
155. Hearings on S. 500 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1959).
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ment or preparation already made or would unduly delay the procure-
ment . . . .""' The legislative history shows that clause to be the result
of representations in substance that procurement by the negotiated
method in lieu of formal advertising was necessary for essentially two
reasons: only one source would be experienced and familiar with what
was to be procured, and it would be too time-consuming and otherwise
wasteful to use formal advertising.17
Congress appears to have accepted those reasons without considering
their validity. The facts demonstrating the invalidity of the representa-
tions are not hard to find. And no evidence was furnished to support
the representation that formal advertising would be too time-consuming.
On the contrary, it appears reasonable to conclude that the Government
would benefit by the keenness of competition in which bidders have to
sharpen their pencils and figure closely on their own time rather than
on the Government's time as in negotiated procurement. Assurance of
proper quality should be more certain from a production contract awarded
on the basis of formally advertised competition than from one which
the contractor has obtained without the challenge of competition. And
contrary to the representations in the legislative history," 8 the Govern-
ment has the right by implication and express provision of the law to
reject any and all bids when they are based upon miscalculation or
unreasonable prices. 1 9
It is clear from its language and its legislative history that clause
(14), covering production contracts, was drafted on the erroneous theory
that clause (11), covering pre-production (design) contracts, permits
awards without competition as well as without formal advertising. If there
were competition, as the law requires, for awards for work under clause
(11), the duplication of investment and preparation would have occurred
before the production stage covered by (14). Only a comprehensive
evaluation of pertinent cases could establish that competition is not ap-
propriate in most developmental experimental and research contracts. It
appears reasonable to conclude that duplication of investment in the
competitive design model stage could not be as unduly expensive and
time-consuming as the non-competitive procurements of Army tanks 00
156. 70A Stat. 128 (1956) (amended by 76 Stat. 528 (1962) [Pub. L. 87-653 § l(a)], as
amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV, 1963)).
157. S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947).
158. Hearings on Procurement Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 62 (1960); S. Rep. No. 1900, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1960).
159. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(15) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV,
1963).
160. H.R. Rep. No. 958, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
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and Navy demon fighters. 1 Some idea of the enormity of the unwar-
ranted cost of such noncompetitive procurement can be gathered from
an examination of the reports in those two cases in the light of the
enormity of the items covered by clause (14), such as "aircraft, tanks,
radar, missiles, rockets and other items of specialized equipment."
Competition, which embraces both methods of procurement-formally
advertised and negotiated-was not waived in the Armed Services
Procurement Act. Therefore clause (14), which that act related to both
formal advertising and competition, provides no legal basis for limiting
solicitation for negotiated procurement to one source, notwithstanding
GAO's statement to the contrary.16 2 This makes it mandatory for con-
tracting officials to determine whether other qualified suppliers are
willing to make the necessary investment and compete for the award.
GAO has overlooked the fact that the mandate exists and has suggested
that it be established.163 In that connection, it is important to note that
the GAO suggestion is further evidence that GAO is erroneously con-
struing the authority in the law to waive formal advertising as authority
to waive competition. Since the law does not authorize a waiver of com-
petition, the GAO suggestion was inappropriate, regardless of the fact
that it suggested a mandate already in existence.
But the basic reason for the inappropriateness of the GAO suggestion
is equally as serious. The suggestion should have been directed to clause
(11) rather than clause (14). As previously indicated, the real need is
to be certain that competition is obtained, as the law requires, in awards
for work under clause (11). Competition in the developmental and ex-
perimental design stage, as required by clause (11), should establish
more than one qualified supplier able and willing to make the necessary
investment of money and time to eliminate the problem in the production
contract as described in clause (14). Good faith determinations under
(14) should therefore be very rare, if not nonexistent. GAO has spec-
ulated that in some cases, at least, it'would not be able to agree that
determinations under clause (14) had been made in good faith.'" But
the law imposes an obligation on GAO to examine and evaluate, rather
than speculate on, those determinations and report if it does not agree.
And, in view of the foregoing, it is obvious that there would be no sound
basis in most, if not all, cases for GAO to agree if it observed the law
applicable to the use of clause (11) as well as to clause (14). In any
event, the facts needed by Congress-and expected when the clause was
161. H.R. Rep. No. 1891, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
162. Hearings on Procurement, supra note 158, pt. 2, at 150.
163. Id. at 160.
164. Ibid.
1964]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
enacted-to learn whether the use of clause (14) actually is justified, are
not available because GAO has not performed its statutory obligation to
assemble them.
The hearings contain another disturbing example of GAO's willingness
to accept agency determinations without performing its statutory obliga-
tion to examine them to learn whether the supporting facts justify such
acceptance. GAO stated that it had "no quarrel" with the reasoning that
clause (14) was necessary "because adherence to formal advertising
procedures in the procurement of aircraft, missiles, etc., would consist-
ently result in the United States being 1 to 2 years behind latest develop-
ments."' 65 While the apparent misuse of clause (11) provides ample
ground for "quarreling" with that reasoning, GAO referred to no case
facts on which it based its acceptance of such reasoning. On the present
record, it would appear that GAO has no justification for not questioning
the reasoning to which it referred.
The prevailing practice of speculation in lieu of ascertaining the facts
as to the justification for the use of clause (14), and the abuse of clause
(11), could have been avoided soon after the enactment of the Armed
Services Procurement Act of 194716 if GAO had fulfilled the promise
it made and the obligations imposed by Congress upon it under that act,
and approximately twenty-seven years earlier,0 7 to "carefully scrutinize
agency activities,' 61°8 which included agency determinations and findings
under those clauses, and to "report . . .to the Congress."10 That pro-
cedure would have protected the public from the extravagance of non-
competitive procurement and would have given many more businesses,
large and small, an opportunity to share in the profits from Government
procurement activities.
It is not clear on what rational basis Congress supported the retention
of clause (14) or dignified it by approving substitute language, since its
language as originally enacted and under the amendatory modifications,
and its legislative history, show that it is designed to facilitate the precise
situation which GAO challenged in 1959.170 By illegally confining pro-
duction contracts to the development contractor, clause (14) implements
the illegal practice of the defense agencies of awarding contracts for
experimental, developmental or research work without competition, and
165. Id. at 159.
166. 62 Stat. 21 (1948) (now 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-57 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 2304-11 (Supp. IV, 1963)).
167. See note 147 supra.
168. S. Rep. No. 571, supra note 157, at 24.
169. Id. at 26.
170. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 155, at 299.
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would seem necessarily to increase the number of failures to secure
effective design competition and, therefore, to secure any competition for
the subsequent production contract. The insertion of the word "addi-
tional" and a few other word changes in clause (14) by GAO and HASC,
as a part of the legislative processing of Public Law 87-653 said to be
necessary to restore the rule of law to defense procurement, are perhaps
no better example of the fact that what was and remains most urgently
needed to restore the rule of law is not more law but enforcement of
existing law by those responsible for its enforcement. This would require
GAO's discharge of its statutory duty to provide constant, compre-
hensive surveillance of executive agency compliance, evaluation, reports
of contraventions of law and of related incompetence, and refusal to
uphold expenditures of public funds paid out pursuant to agency action
in contravention of law. Only by such dogged, unerring daily action by
GAO can HASC and Congress as a whole eliminate the very substantial
encouragement which the two clauses, (11) and (14), provide in prior law
and in Public Law 87-653 for use of a procurement method unauthorized
by law and for abuse of the executive agency determination prerogative.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Congress is not going to require
GAO to maintain a compliance staff to perform the surveillance imposed
upon it by statute, it should establish another arm to accomplish the
necessary surveillance. That is well illustrated in a case presented on
the House floor by Congressman Wilson. The case involved an article,
called a transducer, used in the hull of naval vessels, in conjunction with
other equipment, to detect the presence of enemy submarines; the Navy
Department proposed to buy it without competition on the basis of a
determination by that Department that it was in the best interests of
the United States that no firms other than one referred to as company
A be allowed to bid or compete for the work. Mr. Wilson stated that he
was told by GAO that the Department's action was justified under 10
U.S.C. § 2304(a)(14). 171 As heretofore indicated, clause (14) is not
authority for procuring without competition, because the clause merely
authorizes procurement without formal advertising. But what appears
equally as serious as that GAO error is that GAO-presumably because
of its theory that it does not have to discharge its statutory responsibility
to review, based on its belief that it has no authority to overrule-
apparently would not have evaluated the Department's determination
unless Mr. Wilson had directed GAO's attention to it. For Mr. Wilson
reported that had it not been for company D's forcing competition in
spite of the Department's determination that it was in the best interests
171. 107 Cong. Rec. 20350 (1961) (remarks of Congressman Wilson).
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of the United States not to have competition, $1 million more than neces-
sary would have been spent for the transducers. Either Mr. Wilson or
GAO is in error. Mr. Wilson's report clearly raises a serious question as
to whether the Department's determination was not so grossly erroneous
as to raise an implication of "bad faith." GAO's report to Mr. Wilson
that the Department's action was justified under clause (14) not only
overlooks the fact that clause (14) is no justification for procurement
without competition, but apparently was made without evaluating, as
Mr. Wilson did, the actual facts related to the determination, to find
whether those facts were sufficient to support such a determination even
if the clause did authorize noncompetitive procurement. It appears from
his rather extensive remarks before the House that the case documents
much more than Mr. Wilson realized. It is a sad but most effective
documentation of the fact that if funds were not otherwise available
for a properly trained GAO compliance staff to discharge the duty of
that office with respect to executive agency decisions and determinations,
such a staff should have been established by the use of some part of the
funds involved in the exceedingly expensive legislative process that cul-
minated in Public Law 87-653. However GAO and HASC, the proponents
of that law, may extol its virtues, neither it nor any significant part of
the law which it amended can operate in the best interests of the Govern-
ment without such a GAO compliance staff as will enable GAO to dis-
charge its statutory obligations, and to perform the scrutiny it committed
itself to in 1947 and which Congress indicated it expected GAO to make.
Mr. Wilson could accomplish much more if he would press for a full-scale
debate on GAO's functioning which, as the transducer case so well illus-
trates, is the real issue. In the meantime, the public can only conclude
that GAO and HASC have merely accomplished a few language changes
rather than any effective control over the defense procurement program.
It now remains to note the one part of the procurement program for which
H.R. 5532 sought but failed to provide legal authority.
.VIII. THE ILLEGALITY OF SET-ASIDE PROCUREMENT
In January 1952, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization
(ODM) requested GAO to advise him whether the national emergency
exception 172 would permit the expenditure of public funds to cover the
award of contracts to a labor surplus area to accomplish certain stated
objectives, when it is known at the time that the services or supplies are
obtainable elsewhere at a lower price. GAO noted in its reply that there
was nothing in the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, which, of
172. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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itself, authorizes generally the negotiation of Government contracts.
GAO further stated, however, that if the military establishments deter-
mined it were necessary in the public interest (under the national
emergency exception of the Armed Services Procurement Act) that
awards be made in specific instances at prices other than the lowest
which might be obtainable, GAO would not be required to object to
otherwise proper payments under contracts so awarded." 3 In short, GAO
held, in effect, that if it were administratively determined to be in the
public interest to negotiate the award of contracts to labor surplus areas,
existing law (i.e., the national emergency exception of the Armed Services
Procurement Act)174 permitted such an award. In its opinion GAO made
no reference to the legislative history of the national emergency exception,
which clearly shows that its use could not be justified for the purpose
approved by GAO and that it is designed not to permit the payment of
price differentials or to promote socio-economic objectives, as implied in
the GAO opinion, but solely to provide procedures in a precipitate situa-
tion requiring such commensurate procurement action at the time the
emergency is declared as not to permit the delay incident to advertising:
With the prospect that any future war may start with great suddenness, minimum
preparedness requires that legislation be available to permit the shedding of peacetime
requirements simultaneously with the declaration of any emergency by the President.
The bill would empower the War and Navy Departments, in such an event, to procure
by negotiation rather than by advertising.175
The situation considered by GAO in its reply to ODM was of no pre-
cipitate nature. Over a year had transpired since the declaration of the
emergency and there was nothing to show that the procurements involved
would not permit the delay of formal advertising. Accordingly, GAO
appears clearly in error in informing ODM that it (GAO) would not be
required to object to ODM's proposed use of the national emergency
exception.
Approximately nine months later GAO repeated the same error. Infilco,
Incorporated, a small business concern, submitted the lowest bid in
response to an invitation issued by the General Services Administration
(GSA). Proportioneers, Incorporated, the next low bidder, located in a
surplus labor area but not a small business concern, was called in and
advised that "if it would lower its bid to meet that of Infilco Incorporated,
the award would be made to it."'70 After Proportioneers, Incorporated,
agreed to reduce its bid to that of the lowest bidder the contract was
173. 31 Decs. Comp. Gen. 279, 282 (1952).
174. See note 172 supra.
175. H.R. Rep. No. 109, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947).
176. 32 Decs. Comp. Gen. 251, 252 (1952).
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awarded to that concern. Infilco contended that the award of the contract
to Proportioneers, Incorporated, was illegal and void and demanded that
the contract be awarded to Infilco, as required by law.
GAO held that the authority for the negotiation of the contract awarded
to Proportioneers, Incorporated, was section 302(c)(1) of the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, which provides that
contracts for purchases and supplies may be negotiated by the agency
head without advertising as "determined to be necessary in the public
interest during the period of a national emergency declared by the
President or by the Congress"; 177 that the action of GSA in awarding
the contract was not an illegal act; and that GAO would not be justified
in objecting to the award . 7  But the GAO decision failed to relate the
socio-economic elements of the problem to the purpose for which the
national emergency exception was established, as shown in its legislative
history. Lacking such relation the decision is unpersuasive; being in fact
unsupported by the basis of the national emergency exception, the error
of its conclusions appears obvious. The illegality of GSA's action in
awarding the contract, the justification for GAO to object to the award,
and its duty under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to report the
illegality to Congress are manifest.
In November of 1952, GAO rendered a decision involving small busi-
ness in which its error is equally as obvious as in the cases involving
surplus labor areas. GAO went so far as to hold that since the Small
Business Act (at that time the Defense Production Act) provided that
small business concerns "shall receive any award or contract or any part
thereof," 79 that act "may be construed as constituting an added excep-
tion to the advertising requirements of section 3709, Revised Statutes, as
amended,"' and that therefore the procurement "legally may be nego-
tiated in the manner proposed without resort to formal advertising."''
The most noticeable error in the GAO holding is that it fails to make
any distinction between the solicitation of bids on the one hand, as pro-
vided for by the various "formal advertising" statutes-section 3709 of
the Revised Statutes, 82 the Armed Services Procurement Act, 8  and the
177. 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1) (1958).
178. 32 Decs. Comp. Gen. 251, 255 (1952).
179. Defense Production Act § 714(f)(2), 65 Stat. 143 (1951), now contained in Small
Business Act § 2(15), 72 Stat. 395 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 644 (1958).
180. 31 Decs. Comp. Gen. 431, 433 (1952).
181. Ibid.
182. Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 84, § 10, 12 Stat. 220, amended by 60 Stat. 809 (1946),
as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
183. See note 166 supra.
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Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949'1-and the
award of contracts on the other hand, as provided for by the Small
Business Act.185 It is clear from the language and the legislative history
of the latter act that it applies to the identity of those who shall receive
the government business after the bids or proposals solicited have been
opened. Neither the act nor its legislative history contains any language
to show that it applies to the solicitation of those bids or proposals, and
it appears reasonable to expect that GAO would be the last to read into
that act an implied amendment to another act, especially another act
which has been the subject of as much misuse as the formal advertising
statutes, with which GAO is well familiar.
There is nothing to show that the functioning of the Small Business Act
of itself would be inconsistent with the operation of the "formal adver-
tising" statutes. Yet GAO held that the Small Business Act, relating to
award of contracts, was an implied amendment of the act relating to the
solicitation of contracts. It is well established that the Legislature will
not be held to have changed a law it did not have under consideration
while enacting a later law, unless the terms of the subsequent act are so
inconsistent with the provisions of prior law that they cannot stand
together. 8 6 The Small Business Act provides that small business concerns
shall receive the awards, where this is determined "(1) to be in the
interest of maintaining or mobilizing the Nation's full productive ca-
pacity, (2) to be in the interest of war or national defense programs,
(3) to be in the interest of assuring that a fair proportion of the total
purchases and contracts for property and services for the Government
are placed with small business concerns, or (4) to be in the interest of
assuring that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property
be made to small business concerns ... These four determinations
are nothing more than a specification of what may constitute circum-
stances "most advantageous to the United States, price and other factors
considered," as provided in the Armed Services Procurement Act.'" If
those determinations are made competently and in good faith, they cannot
be made without first soliciting "free and full" competition, 8s by formal
advertising or negotiation, as the facts warrant, from both large and small
184. Ch. 288, §§ 302-03, 63 Stat. 393 (1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 232-53 (1958).
185. See note 179 supra.
186. 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 6102 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
187. See note 179 supra.
188. 10 U.S.C. § 2305 (1958) provides standards for awards pursuant to formal
advertised bids, but there is no basis for concluding that those standards are not for ap-
plication in negotiated procurement. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (Supp. IV, 1963).
189. 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b) (1958).
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business-because the difference, in price or other factors, between the
bids of the two might be too great to justify any one of the determina-
tions referred to in the Small Business Act. The determinations should
be based on a written finding by the person making them, setting out the
facts and circumstances relied upon,190 and properly related to established
criteria for making such determinations uniformly and justifiably so as
to demonstrate that the determinations are lawful and logical and hence
fully persuasive. Since the four circumstances specified in the Small
Business Act appear to involve highly conjectural and speculative factors,
especially if not supported by considerable statistical material and com-
petent analyses of that material, it seems clear that without constant
review and evaluation by GAO, the determinations would very soon
become stereotyped as others to which GAO has referred,"0 ' and there-
fore not entitled to be considered as final by GAO and the courts. 2 But
GAO has indicated that it does not discharge its statutory duty to review
determinations.'
It is no secret that a record of attentiveness to small business interests
is a political asset. Therefore, Congress as a whole does not appear dis-
turbed over the lack of GAO surveillance of the Small Business Act
determinations or over the erroneous GAO decisions on small business
and other set aside procurement, since, as has been shown, those decisions
and the lack of surveillance make it much easier for small business and
distressed areas to secure Government contracts. But such an attitude
by GAO and Congress is not government by law, which Congress declared
to be the objective in enacting Public Law 87-653, but an indulgence in
expedience involving the whims and caprices of those in both the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the Government-government by men in
its worst form. GAO could achieve much more enduring status in history
if it took the position it did some years ago on another political expedient
adopted by Congress: 0 4 GAO told Congress that if it wished to assist
those in certain areas of the economic community, it should do so directly
190. 10 U.S.C. § 2310(b) (Supp. IV, 1963).
191. S. Rep. No. 4, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1961); Hearings on Military Procure-
ment Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 399 (1960).
192. S. Rep. No. 571, supra note 157, at 26.
193. Hearings and Report on Navy Department Procurement of AN/PRC-41 Radio Sets
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 176
(1962).
194. First War Powers Act ch. 593, § 201, 55 Stat. 839 (1941) (amended by 64 Stat.
1257 (1951). See Exec. Order No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941) ; Exec. Order No. 10210,
16 Fed. Reg. 1049 (1951).
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rather than through a subterfuge.19 In the case of small business the
indulgence of Congress has apparently influenced GAO-the office ex-
pected, by virtue of its statutory responsibility, to be aggressive in pre-
venting, investigating and reporting contraventions of law-to make no
investigations, to issue decisions upholding contraventions of law, and
to declare statutes amended without the requirement of established
legislative processes. Such a stance on the part of GAO negates any
reassurance the public might otherwise have obtained from GAO's state-
ment in 1952 that it would report to Congress whenever "this Office
feels that there has been an improper exercise of authority to negotiate
contracts and make awards for the purpose indicated ....
The error of its 1952 decisions appears to have been tacitly acknowl-
edged in hearings in 1960, when GAO testified that while it has no reason
to disagree with the justification or necessity for negotiating such pro-
curements, such necessity could not properly be based in such cases upon
the existence of a national emergency which at the time, "serves no
purpose other than administrative convenience' 97 in the negotiation of
unilateral small business set-asides. GAO suggested that statutory author-
ity might be obtained by specifically providing for it in section 2304(a)
(17) of the act. 9 ' GAO gave no reason, and no persuasive one appears
to exist, for its conclusion that the negotiation of such area procurements
is necessary and justified. Also, GAO, and the Committee as well,
apparently ignored the fact that in November 1952 GAO had approved
the illegal use of the national emergency exception, and that GAO is
responsible for the issuance of Manpower Policy No. 4 on which the
military departments basically rely in construing the national emergency
exception as authority for the use of negotiation in the three special pro-
curement areas involved in the policy. 199
No legal authority exists to waive formal advertising or competitive
bidding in procurement awarded on the basis of set-asides for small
business or for surplus labor or other distressed areas. -200 Neither the
national emergency exception nor any of the other exceptions in section
?304(a) of the Armed Services Procurement Act, and no other law,
195. H.R. Rep. No. 558, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1955).
196. 31 Decs. Comp. Gen. 279, 282 (1952).
197. Hearings on Procurement, supra note 158, pL2, at 154.
198. Ibid.
199. Hearing on the Implementation of Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 Before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 514-16
(1952).
200. Hearings on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense Before a Special
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1960).
See also 102 Cong. Rec. 2914-17 (1956); H.R. Doc. No. 51, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5080 (1962).
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permit any agency or department of the Government either (1) to
restrict the solicitation2°' of Government business to small business firms
or to firms in labor surplus or other distressed areas, or (2) to restrict
the award of Government business to labor surplus or other distressed
areas, or (3) to make awards to firms in those areas or to small business
firms by negotiation rather than pursuant to established formal adver-
tising procedures. This fact was recognized, in 1960 hearings before the
House Armed Services Committee, by a member who stated: "Under
existing law there is no provision under which the military departments
could procure within these three areas [small business, labor surplus,
and major disaster] by a negotiated contract."202
While its 1960 testimony appears to show GAO in accord with that
Congressman that existing law does not permit such awards by negotia-
tion, it is not clear at what precise time between 1952 and May 1960
GAO became convinced that such awards are illegal. In published deci-
sions in 1959203 and as late as February 2, 1960,201 GAO considered
matters, including protests, involving the negotiation of awards to small
business and surplus labor firms, and raised no question as to their
legality. And in June 1960, a few weeks after it had testified that there
is no legal authority for negotiating awards to small business, GAO
advised that it would not be required to object to the reinstatement of an
invitation to bids which advised that a contract for the portion set aside
to small business firms would be negotiated.215
If a purchase does not require immediate action (no exigency) and
the facts show that delivery can be accomplished by the required date
even with the use of formal advertising, the mere fact that the Govern-
ment wishes to observe a socio-economic policy of Congress of setting
aside certain purchases for delivery by small business concerns,2 0 or of
relieving distressed or labor surplus areas, does not establish either that
it is not possible (feasible, practicable) to make the purchase by formal
advertising or that there is any exception which would authorize pur-
chase by negotiation if formal advertising were not possible (feasible,
practicable). The Department of Defense testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee that it relies on the national emergency excep-
tion as its authority to purchase by negotiation rather than by formal
201. Section 2(15) of the Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 395 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 644
(1958), only authorizes small business to "receive any award of contract ....
202. Hearings on Procurement Practices, supra note 200, at 749.
203. 39 Decs. Comp. Gen. 38 (1959).
204. Id. at 553.
205. Id. at 834.
206. See note 179 supra.
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advertising, "because restricting competition [to small business concerns]
is inconsistent with a cardinal principle of formal advertising, namely
that there be full and free competition. 20 7 But the Department of
Defense implies, and we agree, that formal advertising is needed to
accomplish "full and free competition" among the whole business com-
munity, that is, when the purchase is not restricted to small business.
The Department failed to show, however, that formal advertising is not
necessary to secure full and free competition among a'selected class of
that community, namely, the small business class.
In its report of April 30, 1962, on H.R. 5532, HASC included "the
three unilateral set-aside programs" among "all that remains without
statutory authority, '2 8 and reiterated that "we msut [sic] restore the
'rule of law' to defense procurement ' 20 9 which, it stated, "is the purpose
of this bill [H.R. 5532]. "21° Section (d) of the bill was designed to
achieve that purpose.- 11 The bill with that section intact passed the
House,2 '2 but the Senate struck the section before favorably acting on
the bill.213 Thus, the statutory authority for set-asides was not achieved,
the rule of law was not restored, and the number of contraventions of
law increases with each set-aside procurement.
It is ironical, to say the least, that even if subsection (d) of H.R. 5532
had not been stricken and had become a part of Public Law 87-653, its
purpose would have been defeated by subsection (a), which requires
formal advertising if it is possible (feasible, practicable). As previously
noted, the mere fact that the Government wishes to observe a socio-
economic policy of Congress by setting aside certain purchases for
delivery by small business does not establish that it is not possible
(feasible, practicable) to make the purchase by formal advertising. Thus,
with or without subsection (d), the agencies would not have had, just
207. Hearings on Procurement, supra note 158, pt. 1, at 44.
208. H.R. Rep. No. 1638, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
209. Id. at 3.
210. Id. at 2.
211. "(d) Subsection 2304(a)(17) is amended to read as follows: '(17) otherwise
authorized by law, or when in furtherance of small business, labor surplus area, or major
disaster area programs, the agency head determines that supplies or services are to be
procured from small business concerns as defined by the Administrator of the Small Busi-
ness Administration, from concerns which will perform the contracts substantially within
labor surplus areas as determined by the Secretary of Labor, or major disaster as determined
by the President: Provided however, That no contract in furtherance of small business,
labor surplus area or major disaster area program shall be awarded, pursuant to the
authority herein contained, at prices higher than obtainable from other sources.'
212. 108 Cong. Rec. 9976-79 (1962).
213. 108 Cong. Rec. 17351 (1962).
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as previously, any legal authority to waive formal advertising and com-
petitive bidding in procurement awarded on the basis of set-asides for
small business or for surplus labor or other distressed areas. Such pro-
curement is clearly in contravention of law and in direct conflict with
the avowed purpose of the legislation to "restore the 'rule of law' to
defense procurement," and GAO again appears responsible for the situa-
tion and its continuance.
